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I. INTRODUCTION: BRUTUS, CONSTITUTIONAL ROT AND CYCLICAL
CALLS FOR COURT REFORM
Once upon a time, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
the phrase “judicial independence” struck fear into the hearts of many
Americans, especially those associated with the Anti-Federalist movement.
Robert Yates, for example, writing under the pseudonym “Brutus,” wrote with
horror of the proposed independence of the judiciary:
[The Constitution has] made the judges independent, in the fullest
sense of the word. There is no power above them, to controul any of
their decisions. There is no authority that can remove them, and they
cannot be controuled by the laws of the legislature. In short, they are
independent of the people, of the legislature, and of every power under
heaven. Men placed in this situation will generally soon feel
themselves independent of heaven itself.1

Brutus was not alone in sounding the alarm about the dangers of a truly
independent judiciary.2 Thomas Jefferson, in a letter to Spencer Roane in
1819, referred to the Constitution as “a mere thing of wax in the hands of the
judiciary” and warned that “it should be remembered as an axiom of eternal
truth in politics that whatever power in any government is independent, is
absolute also.”3
Alexander Hamilton, as persuader-in-chief of the constitutional
ratification period, provided a rebuttal to these alarmist critiques of the
proposed design for the federal judiciary. In an essay we now refer to as
Federalist No. 78,4 Hamilton vigorously defended the importance of judicial
independence for the rule of law and for the integrity of our written
Constitution. Hamilton emphasized that the judicial branch, precisely because
of its structural independence, was the only branch positioned to serve as the
guardian of the Constitution5. Constitutional rights and protections, Hamilton
reasoned, would be safe – or at least safest given the alternatives – with a
judiciary removed from public pressures.6
But there are caveats – significant ones – in Hamilton’s essay; caveats
that many seem to have forgotten about. The judiciary had to exercise its
1. Letters of Brutus, XV, N.Y. J., March 20, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 186–89 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72
S. CAL. L. REV. 315, 321 (1999).
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Spencer Roane, (Sept. 6, 1819),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-0734
[https://perma.cc/X5BT-5RLG]..
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 432–40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1999).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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power in a particular way, separated from and distinct from politics and from
the political branches. If the courts were ever to become simply another arm
of partisan politics, Hamilton warned, the consequences for liberty and for the
rule of law would be frightful to contemplate.7 If these Hamiltonian caveats
were to be realized, judicial independence would not only be threatened, it
would become threatening. That is, under certain conditions, judicial
independence – as Brutus, Jefferson, and the Anti-Federalists feared – would,
in fact, become dangerous for and destructive to the American constitutional
system.
In The Cycles of Constitutional Time, Jack Balkin argues that we are
currently witnessing the very conditions that make judicial independence
potentially dangerous and destructive for our system.8 Collectively, Balkin
refers to these conditions as “constitutional rot.”9 Constitutional rot is a period
marked by the visible and identifiable “backsliding in democratic and
republican norms and institutions” that is usually indicative of the impending
death of one constitutional regime and the birth of another.10 In the Parts that
follow, using Balkin’s excellent analysis as a jumping off point, I give a bit
more texture to some of these drivers of our current period of constitutional
rot. Specifically, I examine polarization, partisanship, court capture, and the
trend of increasing judicial supremacy and the finality of Supreme Court
rulings as ingredients of constitutional rot.
These dynamics help explain and contextualize the sudden resurgence
of calls for court reform on the left, which I am calling the “exhumation of
Brutus.” This is especially true in the wake of the jarring and sudden death of
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the fevered battle to fill her seat just days
before the 2020 presidential election.11

7. Id. at 434.
8. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME, 44–45 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2020).
9. Id. at 45.
10. Id.
11. Mark Z. Barabak & Janet Hook, McConnel vows to fill Ginsburg’s seat
thrusting court to center of 2020 presidential race, L.A. TIMES, (Sept. 18, 2020),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-09-18/ruth-bader-ginsburg-trumpbiden-mcconnell-politics.
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II. RECIPE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ROT: A PARTISAN COURT, A
CAPTURED COURT, AND A MORE SUPREME COURT12
In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville observed something rather unique
about the fledgling American democracy; namely, that “Scarcely any political
question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
judicial question.”13 Almost two centuries later, this observation rings truer
than ever. With polarization and gridlock in Congress, individuals and
organized interest groups are increasingly looking to the judicial branch to
carry out their policy agendas. The Supreme Court, itself intensely divided
along partisan lines, has demonstrated a willingness to play a more active,
hands-on role in politics. In the last decade, for example, the high court has
issued divided and divisive rulings on voting rights,14 campaign finance,15 gun
rights,16 contraception,17 marriage equality,18 healthcare,19 immigration,20
abortion,21 and LGBTQ discrimination,22 just to name a few.
As political scientists since Alexis de Tocqueville have observed, certain
underlying features of our political system and culture invite lawyers and
judges to play a significant role in policymaking in the United States. These
features include a mismatch between our inherited political institutions, our
political culture, and a politically selected, independent federal judiciary with
the power of judicial review.
That our political institutions reflect a profound distrust and skepticism
of concentrated power has been an implicit feature of our political culture. As
James Madison famously wrote in Federalist No. 51: “In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and
12. Parts of this section originally appeared in Amanda Hollis-Brusky, An
Activist’s Court: Political Polarization and the Roberts Court, in PARCHMENT
BARRIERS: POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
(2018).
13. ALEX DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
1945).
14. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
15. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also McCutcheon v.
FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).
16. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), see also McDonald
v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
17. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Inc., 573 U.S.682 (2014).
18. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
19. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. V. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012); see also
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 988 (2015).
20. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California. 140 S.
Ct. 1891 (2020).
21. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
22. See Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct.
1719 (2018); Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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in the next place oblige it to control itself.”23 Dividing and fragmenting power
through federalism and the separation of powers, our Madisonian system of
government was designed to reign in and prevent an overly active or energetic
government.24 On the other hand, in tension with these inherited political and
constitutional structures, we have a political culture that increasingly seeks
out and demands “total justice”25 – that is, a set of attitudes that “expects and
demands comprehensive governmental protections from serious harm,
injustice and environmental dangers.”26 In short, Americans increasingly
want the government to protect them from harm – to ensure their airplanes
and vehicles are safe, their food and water are not poisoned, and their toys are
not harmful to children27 – but the fragmented political institutions we have
inherited on top of our lingering skepticism of “Big Government” make
courts, not legislatures or bureaucracies, a much more appealing option for
satisfying these demands.
Thomas Burke, building on the work of Robert A. Kagan, explains how
and why this mismatch between our political structures and our political
culture invites and encourages policymaking through litigation and courts:
First, courts offer activists a way to address social problems without
seeming to augment the power of the state. . . Second, [policymaking
through litigation] offer[s] a means of overcoming the barriers to
activist government posed by the structures of the Constitution. . .
activists [can] surmount the fragmented, decentralized structure of
American government, which, (as its creators intended and James
Madison famously boasted) makes activist government difficult.28

An independent and politically selected judiciary makes litigation even
more attractive to policy entrepreneurs; especially to those on the losing end
of the political process. Political losers and political minorities turn to the
independent judiciary (that is, unelected and unaccountable) in the hopes of
persuading judges of claims that fail to command a majority in the legislature.
Because federal courts have the power of judicial review, interest groups
and policy entrepreneurs routinely ask them to strike down federal and state
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
24. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 15 (2nd ed., Harvard Univ.
Press 2019); see also THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS 7
(2004).
25. See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE (1994).
26. KAGAN, supra note 24, at 15.
27. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW IN AMERICA 6–7 (2nd prtg. 2004).
28. BURKE, supra note 24, at 7.
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statutes, or to overturn the rulings of administrative agencies. Additionally,
the decentralized structure of the American judiciary actively encourages
forum shopping; that is, well-resourced policy entrepreneurs testing their
claims in multiple courts in the hopes of finding a sympathetic judge who is
willing to creatively interpret existing statutory or constitutional language to
advance their policy agenda (or to thwart the policy agenda of their political
opponents).29
The underlying structural and cultural features that have long invited
judges and lawyers to play a role in American politics have been amplified
over the past twenty years by political polarization in Congress, the rise of
divided government, and alternating and uncertain party control of
government. These developments in our legislative politics have further
incentivized groups or movements seeking policy change to opt for a strategy
of litigation over legislation, turning the Supreme Court into what I have
elsewhere referred to as “an Activist’s Court.”30

A. Ingredients of Constitutional Rot: Political Polarization + A
Partisan Court31
One of the primary features of constitutional rot, according to Balkin, is
polarization: “[R]ot encourages polarization and it is exacerbated by
polarization.”32 Since 1980 – incidentally, the beginning of our current
constitutional regime according to Jack Balkin – the ideological distance
between the Democrat and Republican elites has grown at a remarkable rate.33
Prior to Ronald Reagan’s rise to power, there was “no meaningful gap in the
median liberal-conservative scores of the two parties,” with both Democrats
and Republicans in Congress occupying “every ideological niche.”34 Fast
forward four decades and there is currently no ideological overlap between
the two parties in Congress. The most liberal Republican is still to the right
of the most conservative Democrat, and vice-versa. Political scientists refer
to this phenomenon as “political polarization.” Because “the Supreme Court
follows the election returns,”35 our polarized politics have produced a
polarized, ideologically divided judiciary.
As regime politics theory details, because we have a politically selected
judiciary, over time the courts will tend to reflect the values of the electoral

29. KAGAN, supra note 24, at 16.
30. Hollis-Brusky, supra note 12.
31. Parts of this section originally appear in Hollis-Brusky, supra note 12.
32. Balkin, supra note 8, at 151.
33. Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. Rev. 301, 321 (2016).
34. Id. at 29.
35. Forrest Maltzman, Lee Sigelman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Supreme Court
Justices Really Do Follow the Election Returns, 37 PS: POL. SCI. & POLITICS 839, 839
(2004).
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coalition that dominates.36 As Cornell Clayton and Michael Salamone write,
“During the past 40 years, American politics has been dominated by a partisan
regime that is at once more conservative than the New Deal regime it replaced,
but also more closely divided and polarized than any in more than a
century.”37 Control of the White House and control of the Senate has
vacillated between Republicans and Democrats since the early-1990s when
the most senior Associate Justice was appointed to the Supreme Court.38 This
pattern of alternating party dominance in national electoral politics, coupled
with the rise of strategic retirements by judges and Justices since President
Clinton (that is, retiring under an ideologically compatible or same-party
president),39 has left us with a correspondingly divided and polarized Supreme
Court.
The rise of divided government and alternating party control has also
resulted in increasing gridlock and obstructionism in the federal government,
which has further encouraged policy entrepreneurs to use the courts rather
than legislatures to advance their own policy agendas. Though pursuing a
legal strategy to advance a policy agenda can be risky due to the unpredictable
nature of judicial rulings40 and the various constraints that inhibit courts from
easily enforcing broad and sweeping changes in policy,41 groups are more
attracted to litigation as a strategy under two primary conditions: when
significant political and institutional barriers make litigation the only realistic
option42 and when policy entrepreneurs want to insulate their policy gains43

36. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making and Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 298–99 (1957); Howard Gillman,
Courts and the Politics of Partisan Coalitions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND POLITICS 644, 645 (Keith E. Whittington et al. eds., 2008).
37. Cornell W. Clayton & Michael S. Salamone, Still Crazy After All These
Years: The Polarized Politics of the Roberts Court Continue, 12 THE FORUM 739, 740
(2014).
38.
Current
Members,
SUP.
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx
[https://perma.cc/V7DSB497] (last visited Feb. 4, 2021).
39. Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polarization in the
US Supreme Court, in AMERICAN GRIDLOCK: THE SOURCES, CHARACTER AND IMPACT
OF POLITICAL POLARIZATION 171, 179 (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2015).
40. See generally KAGAN, supra note 24.
41. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE (John Tryneski
ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2008).
42. See Silverstein, Law’s Allure. See also, Burke, Lawyers Lawsuits and
Litigation.
43. See generally, Thomas F Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits and Legal Rights.
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from shifting and uncertain electoral fortunes.44 Both conditions currently
exist.
Divided government, which occurs when one political party controls the
presidency while the opposition controls at least one branch of Congress (and
which has been the norm in American politics since 1989),45 erects barriers to
policymaking through legislative channels. This is because divided
government, particularly when coupled with ideologically distant parties,
increases the number of potential veto points in the policymaking process,
often requiring supermajorities to pass legislation. As Thomas Keck writes,
“[O]n both the left and the right, legislative losers turn to the courts as a matter
of course.”46 More veto points and more gridlock makes virtually every group
a “legislative loser” and makes the courts a more attractive venue.47 Instead
of having to win the votes of majorities or super-majorities in the legislature,
at the Supreme Court, one only needs to secure five votes.48
Pursuing policy through the courts also allows policy entrepreneurs to
“insulate” their victories from political enemies.49 This is a particularly
attractive option when partisan control of the legislature and the executive is
in near-constant flux and turnover, as it has been since the 1980s.50 In the
period from 1980-2015, for example, control of the presidency alternated
between Democrats and Republicans four times, the Senate changed hands
seven times, and the House of Representatives three times.51 And, as I
detailed earlier, for the majority of this period, no single party had control of
both houses of Congress and the presidency.52 This makes policy gains
44. See, e.g., FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES 1 (Univ. of Chicago Press
2016).
45. Tyler Hughes & Deven Carlson, How Party Polarization Makes the
Legislative Process Even Slower When Government is Divided, UNITED STATES
POLITICS & POLICY BLOG, (May 19, 2015), http://bit.ly/1EhrEsO
[https://perma.cc/J8UH-6XY7].
46. THOMAS M. KECK, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN POLARIZED TIMES 20 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 2014).
47. See BALKIN, supra note 8, at 139–40.
48. It is illustrative here to cite the late Associate Justice William Brennan’s
famous Rule of Five: “Brennan liked to greet his new clerks each fall by asking them
what they thought was the most important thing they needed to know as they began
their work in his chambers. The pair of stumped novices would watch quizzically as
Brennan held up five fingers. Brennan then explained that with five votes, you could
accomplish anything” Dawn Johnsen, Justice Brennan: Legacy of a Champion, 111
MICH. L. REV. 1151, 1159 (2013).
49. BURKE, supra note 24, at 14–15.
50. See Party Government Since 1857, HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES: U.S. HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES
(last
visited
February
4,
2021),
https://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/Party-Government/
[https://perma.cc/M9HA-9WL2].
51. Id.
52. Id. Between 1980 and 2015, the government was unified just seven of the
total eighteen sessions of Congress during that period. Id.
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through the federal legislature a risky and uncertain bet. Even if one party
does manage to secure unified government for a short period, as the
Democrats did between 2009 and 2011,53 any policies passed – even major
legislation like the Affordable Care Act – must be considered to be unstable
and uncertain.54 When the Republicans took back the House and the Senate
in the ensuing years, they voted more than fifty times to repeal or roll-back
parts of the Act.55 These efforts failed only because the Democrats maintained
control of the presidency. Because courts are relatively independent from the
rest of the political system, they can provide a “seemingly safer route” for
policymaking and implementation than the political branches.56 Moreover,
because judges serve longer terms and create legal precedent with their
rulings, judicial decisions tend to be stickier or more “path-dependent” than
those in the political branches.57
Not only is the Supreme Court more polarized than ever before, as
Balkin notes,58 it is also more identifiably partisan than any time in the last
100 years. Since 2010, for example, the Supreme Court has been strictly
divided along partisan lines, with every Justice appointed by a Democratic
president voting more liberally than every Justice appointed by a Republican
president.59 Far from being the historical norm, this partisan divide is out of
step with traditional patterns of voting and alignment on the Court.60 For
example, the Roberts Court has split or “sharply divided” (five-to-four, fourto-four, four-to-three, or three-to-two) on nearly one of every five decisions it
has rendered, which is the highest rate of division of any court since the New
Deal.61 This partisan split on the Court has produced divided and divisive

53. Id.
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001–18122
(2010).
55. Byron York, No, House Republicans Haven’t Voted 50 Times to Repeal
EXAMINER
(Mar.
15,
2014,
12:00
AM),
Obamacare,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/no-house-republicans-havent-voted-50-timesto-repeal-obamacare [https://perma.cc/J3R7-JWTS].
56. BURKE, supra note 24, at 15.
57. See Silverstein, supra note 42, at 1086–91; AMANDA HOLLIS-BRUSKY, IDEAS
WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE CONSERVATIVE
COUNTERREVOLUTION 149–51 (Steven Teles ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2015).
58. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 118–21.
59. Devins & Baum, supra note 33.
60. Id. at 310.
61. Clayton & Salamone, supra note 37, at 745.
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five-to-four rulings on major issues such as gun control,62 health care,63 voting
rights,64 campaign finance,65 and fair housing.66 As Brandon Bartels notes, a
“vicious circle” exists between polarization on the Supreme Court and the
nomination process, with each political party vying to either preserve (the
Republicans) or dismantle (the Democrats) the first ideologically
homogenous voting bloc on the Supreme Court since the Warren Court.67
This identifiable pattern of partisan voting and behavior on the Supreme
Court has invited politicians, scholars, and commentators to attack and
attempt to delegitimize judicial rulings by noting that the judiciary is doing
nothing more than enacting its preferred policy and voting on strictly partisan
lines.68 This has consequences for how the public views the legitimacy of the
federal judiciary. Political science literature puts an exclamation point on this,
demonstrating the damaging and corrosive effects these portrayals of the
federal judiciary as “just another political institution” can have on the
legitimacy of the courts.69
Stephen Nicholson and Thomas Hansford write that the public’s
perception of the Supreme Court as a “legal” versus a “political” institution is
key to the public’s perception of its legitimacy.70 James L. Gibson and
Michael Nelson confirmed this finding with recent survey research.71 These
scholars concluded that the single greatest threat to the Supreme Court’s
legitimacy comes from its perceived politicization; that is, the belief that
“judges are little more than ‘politicians in robes.’”72 More recent research
suggests how perceptions of a politicized judiciary can be exacerbated by
This
high-profile and contentious judicial confirmation hearings.73
scholarship provides contemporary empirical support for what Alexander
62. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
63. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
64. See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
65. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
66. See, e.g., King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
67. BARTELS, supra note 39, at 172.
68. See, e.g., James Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a
Polarized Polity, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 507 (2007).
69. James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering Positivity Theory:
What Roles do Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and Legal Realism Play in
Shaping U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 592, 592
(2017).
70. Stephen P. Nicholson & Thomas G. Hansford, Partisans in Robes: Party
Cues and Public Acceptance of Supreme Court Decisions, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 620,
620–636 (2014).
71. Id.
72. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 69, at 595.
73. Christopher N. Krewson & Jean R. Schroedel, Public Views of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the Aftermath of the Kavanaugh Confirmation, 101 SOC. SCI. Q.
1430, 1430 (2020).
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Hamilton knew to be true even in the eighteenth century74: the judiciary’s
power under our constitution – its very legitimacy – depends on the people
seeing it as distinct from politics.

B. Ingredients of Constitutional Rot: A Captured Court75
When courts become deeply involved in politics and policymaking, in
addition to putting their institutional legitimacy on the line, they also run the
risk of provoking some of the more pernicious features of our constitutional
design. Policymaking through courts – that is, when judges become “the
vanguard of policy change”76 – can invite elite capture or minority tyranny
and weaken the checks and balances built into the constitution. Policymaking
through courts invites a handful of elite, unelected lawyers and judges to craft
and shape policy, which in turn facilitates the kind of minority capture our
Constitution was designed to guard against.
When policy entrepreneurs turn to courts instead of legislatures, they can
effectively circumvent the various safeguards and constitutional veto points
built into the legislative process (congressional committees, majority
requirements, supermajority requirements, and the presidential veto). These
veto points are designed to decelerate the legislative process, to ensure broad
coalitions for governing, and to prevent smaller, energetic “factions” from
capturing and dominating the process. As James Madison wrote in Federalist
No. 10, among the “numerous advantages” of this model of government was
its ability to “break and control the violence of faction” by “extending the
sphere” and multiplying the number of competing voices and distinct interests
involved in the process.77 These multiple veto points “foster more pluralistic
legislative inputs and outputs” and prevent legislatures from acting swiftly
and energetically.78
Policymaking by lawyers and judges circumvents these checks, leaving
policy in the hands of the few, unelected elite, which, if we follow Madison’s
analysis in Federalist No. 10, facilitates tyranny of the minority, or elite
capture:
74. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
75. Parts of this section first appeared in my written testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee. See Testimony Before the Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on
Courts, Intell. Prop. and the Internet, 116th Cong. (2020) (statement of Amanda
Hollis-Brusky, Assoc. Professor, Pomona Coll.).
76. BALKIN, supra note 8, at 139.
77. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 71 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
78. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on
Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611,
643 (2014).
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The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests,
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will
they concert and execute their plans of oppression.79

When it comes to judicial policymaking, the number of individuals with
access to power and the “compass” within which they are placed are both
incredibly small.
To make policy through the Supreme Court, for example, policy
entrepreneurs simply need to secure five votes.80 And, while historically the
Justices of the Supreme Court have come from diverse backgrounds,
education, and careers, we currently have a Supreme Court that is composed
entirely of elite, educated lawyers (eight of whom attended Ivy League law
schools) with no political or legislative experience.81 As Mark Graber writes,
Supreme Court “[j]ustices tend to act on elite values because Justices are
almost always selected from the most affluent and highly educated stratum of
Americans.”82 In other words, Madison’s recipe for elite capture in Federalist
No. 10 (a small number of people with uniform interests and backgrounds
who can readily and easily concert to execute their plans) reads like a template
for our current Supreme Court.83
Moreover, because judicial policymaking requires lawyers to argue and
bring cases to the courts (judges and Justices cannot simply make cases and
questions appear before them “as if by magic”),84 the policymaking process is
de facto captured and controlled by this unelected, elite group. This capture
by lawyers has become even more pronounced over the past two decades, with
the rise of the Federalist Society on the right and the American Constitution
Society on the left. As I write in Ideas with Consequences: The Federalist
Society and the Conservative Counterrevolution, these two groups of lawyers
are actively working to shape both the “supply side” of judicial policymaking
(bringing cases, organizing litigation campaigns, providing intellectual

79. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 77, at 78.
80. Robert E. Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United
States Supreme Court, 1900-90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667, 667 (1993).
81. Michelle McGough, How to diversify the Ivy League club that is the Supreme
Court,
LOS
ANGELES
TIMES
(Oct.
28,
2014),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-supreme-court-diversity-ivyleague-20141028-story.html.
82. Mark Graber, The Coming Constitutional Yo-Yo? Elite Opinion,
Polarization, and the Direction of Judicial Decision Making, 56 HOW. L. J., 661, 664
(2013).
83. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
84. See CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 5 (1998). See also HOLLISBRUSKY, supra note 57.
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support for judicial decisions) as well as the “demand side” (working to get
particular kinds of judges and Justices nominated and confirmed).85
For reasons I explore in more depth in Ideas, only one of these groups
has managed to actually achieve a “de-facto monopoly” on the “training,
promotion and disciplining of lawyers and judges”86: the Federalist Society
for Law and Public Policy Studies. It is worthwhile for that reason to spend
some time examining how they achieved this “monopoly” as this could be
perceived by the public as capture or at the very least politicization of the
courts.87
Launched in 1982 by a small group of conservative and libertarian law
students at Yale Law School and the University of Chicago Law School, the
Federalist Society was founded to provide an alternative to the perceived
liberal orthodoxy that dominated the law school curriculum, the professoriate,
and most legal institutions at the time.88 Almost 40 years later, the Federalist
Society has moved beyond law schools and grown into a vast network of
upwards of 70,000 conservative and libertarian lawyers, policymakers,
legislators, judges, journalists, academics, and law students.89 The project of
the Federalist Society was and is to create a conservative counter-elite – that
is, a group of interconnected legal professionals dedicated to conservative
judicial and policy positions – and to actively work to get these people into
positions of power where they can push the law and public policy in a
conservative direction.90 Federalist Society co-founder Steven Calabresi
described this project in our interview together:
I think my own goal for the Federalist Society has been . . . [to] have
an organization that will create a network of alumni who have been
shaped in a particular way. . . . [B]ecause many of our members are
right of center and because they tend to be interested in public policy
and politics, a lot of them go on to do jobs in government and take
positions in government where they become directly involved in
policymaking. So I think it’s fair to say that Federalist Society alumni

85. See HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 165–75.
86. Id. at 152–55..
87. This section borrows heavily from my previously published work. See
HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57.
88. See HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57.
89. About Us, THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, https://fedsoc.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/SKE5-4ZED].
90. David Montgomery, Conquerors of the Court, THE WASHINGTON POST
MAGAZINE
(Jan.
2,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/02/feature/conquerors
-of-the-courts/ [https://perma.cc/HQ3R-WH3X].
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who go into government have tended to push public policy in a
libertarian–conservative direction.91

As I detail in Ideas with Consequences, the Federalist Society has been
incredibly successful in its project to “push public policy” and judicial
decision-making in a conservative-libertarian direction.92 I briefly outline
below three ways the Federalist Society – now with a six-Justice supermajority on the Supreme Court – continues to exert its influence on the federal
courts.

1. Judicial Selection93
As several Federalist Society members said to me in our interviews
together, “policy is people.” There is a recognition that in order for ideas to
have consequences, you need to get people who share those ideas and provide
them with access to the levers of power. When it comes to the federal courts,
this is done first by populating White House counsel and those responsible for
judicial selection under Republican administrations with Federalist Society
network members. Don McGahn, former White House Counsel under
President Trump and stalwart Federalist Society member, has openly and
repeatedly referred to this as “in-sourcing” judicial selection to the Federalist
Society.94 Those network members working within the administration then
identify, vet, and select judges with identifiable and reliable ties to the
Federalist Society network. In this way, as Federalist Society member
Michael Greve put it in our 2008 interview, the Federalist Society has “a de
facto monopoly” on the process. Highlighting the contrast between the
Federalist Society on the right and attempts to replicate its influence on the
left, Greve emphasized, “on the left there a million ways of getting
credentialed, on the political right, there’s only one way in these legal
circles.”95

91. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 10.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 153–55.
94. Robert Barnes, Federalist Society, White House Cooperation on Judges
WASHINGTON
POST,
(Nov.
18,
2017),
Paying
Benefits,
THE
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/federalist-society-white-housecooperation-on-judges-paying-benefits/2017/11/18/4b69b4da-cb20-11e7-8321481fd63f174d_story.html. It is worth noting that at a March 2020 conference on the
future of judicial nominations at Princeton University that I attended, McGahn’s
keynote doubled down on the synchronous relationship between the Republican Party
and the Federalist Society, noting that he only hired Federalist Society members in his
office and his office only considered Federalist Society judges because this credential
signaled loyalty to the team.
95. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 152.
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2. Lobbying the Courts96
Once Federalist Society judges are appointed to the federal bench, they
can then be lobbied or helped by fellow network members who support them
in pushing the law in a conservative-libertarian direction. Primarily, this
involves Federalist Society members providing judges and their clerks with
what I call “intellectual capital” to help them justify radically altering or
reshaping longstanding constitutional frameworks. Because judges and
Justices do not simply “vote” like legislators, but instead publish judicial
opinions that outline their reasoning and provide justifications for their
decisions, courts are uniquely susceptible to this kind of intellectual influence
and lobbying. As I show in Ideas, in some of the most controversial decisions
of the conservative counterrevolution currently underway on the Supreme
Court, the Federalist Society network played a key role in providing the
intellectual support and scaffolding for these judicial opinions.97

3. Acting as a Vocal and Vigilant “Judicial Audience”98
To have a serious and lasting influence on the direction of constitutional
law and jurisprudence – a constitutional revolution – you need to appoint the
right kinds of judges and Justices to the federal judiciary and then you need to
make sure that, once appointed, they do not fall victim to “judicial drift” – that
is, the observed tendency for some conservative Supreme Court appointees to
moderate their beliefs during their tenure on the court. It has been welldocumented that the Federalist Society influences the first half of this equation
under Republican administrations – who gets appointed – but, as I show in
Ideas, it also influences the second half of the equation by exerting social and
psychological pressure to keep these judges faithful to their Federalist Society
principles once on the bench.99
This function is best understood in light of political scientist Lawrence
Baum’s concept of a “judicial audience.”100 In his book, Judges and Their
Audiences,101 Baum draws on research in social psychology to argue that
judges, like all other people, seek approval or applause from certain social and
professional groups, and that the manner in which a judge decides cases and
writes opinions may be influenced by certain “audiences” the judge knows
96. Id. at 148–52.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 155–59.
99. Id.
100. See BALKIN, supra note 8, at 118–21.
101. Lawrence Baum, JUDGES AND THE THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 24–49 (2006).
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will be paying attention to his or her “performance.”102 Moreover, Baum
shows that of all the types of audiences for whom a judge might perform,
“social groups and the legal community have the greatest impact on the
choices of most judges.”103 The Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy,
as a social and professional network extending to all levels of the legal
community, can be understood as a hybrid of both of these most influential
referent groups for judges. I provide anecdotes from my interviews with
Federalist Society members who describe approaching judges and Justices at
Federalist Society conferences and dinners and meetings and telling them
“face to face” that these judges and Justices erred. In fact, these members
valued the opportunity, through the Federalist Society, to provide “direct
feedback” to these judges.104

4. The Trump Administration: “In-Sourcing” Federalist Society
Influence
Whereas the pages of Ideas chronicle the subtle, behind-the-scenes
manner in which Federalist Society members worked in the Reagan, George
H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush administrations to influence judicial
selection and decisionmaking, the Trump administration has taken Federalist
Society access and influence to a new zenith.105 Even before Trump was
sworn into office, his campaign took the unprecedented step of releasing a list
of twenty-one potential Supreme Court nominees – a list curated by multiple
Federalist Society network members, including Vice President of the
Federalist Society Leonard Leo – two months prior to the election with the
aim of wooing partisan Republicans who might otherwise be loath to vote for
Trump.106
President Trump made good on his promise to appoint judges “in the
mold of Justice Scalia,” repaying partisan Republicans and the Federalist
Society network for their loyalty.107 With Federalist Society Vice President
Leonard Leo at his side, advising him and helping to shepherd his nominees
102. Id.
103. Id. at 118.
104. HOLLIS-BRUSKY, supra note 57, at 155.
105. Id.
106. Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme Court, THE NEW
YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/04/17/theconservative-pipeline-to-the-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/FLT5-N3MP]; John
Malcolm, How Trump Changed the Courts in 2017, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 27,
2017), https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/how-trump-changed-the-courts2017 [https://perma.cc/GG4N-FTTG].
107. Jonathan Adler, How Scalia-esque will Donald Trump’s Supreme Court
nominee
be?,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Jan.
26,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/26/howscalia-esque-will-donald-trumps-supreme-court-nominee-be/
[https://perma.cc/NK2N-QRD3].
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through confirmation, it is no overstatement to say that Trump has changed
the face and the ideological balance of the federal judiciary, appointing young,
conservative Federalist Society-type judges for lifetime terms.108 As his
administration comes to a close, Trump can claim over 200 Article III
appointees to the federal judiciary.109
Perhaps most consequentially, Trump has helped the Federalist Society
secure a six-Justice super-majority on the Supreme Court for the first time in
history.110 Newly minted Justice Amy Coney Barrett has joined Federalist
Society brethren John Roberts, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Neil
Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh,111 securing a super-majority voting bloc on

108. Tessa Berenson, Inside Trump’s Plan to Dramatically Reshape U.S.
Courts, TIME MAGAZINE (Feb. 8, 2018), https://time.com/5139118/inside-trumpsplan-to-dramatically-reshape-us-courts/ [https://perma.cc/KW8Q-XBTM].
109. John Gramlich, How Trump Compares with Other Recent Presidents in
Appointing Federal Judges, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/13/how-trump-compares-withother-recent-presidents-in-appointing-federal-judges/
[https://perma.cc/JZC9WMA3].
110. Michael Avery & Danielle McLaughlin, Barrett Poised to Be Sixth
SCOTUS Justice Hand-Picked by Federalist Society, TRUTHOUT, (Oct. 24, 2020),
https://truthout.org/articles/barrett-poised-to-be-sixth-scotus-justice-hand-picked-byfederalist-society/ [https://perma.cc/UNW5-CHTB] . Just weeks into his term as
president, Trump selected long-time Federalist Society member and conservative
judge Neil Gorsuch to fill Scalia’s seat on the Supreme Court. In another Federalist
Society-friendly twist of fate, in June of 2018, Reagan appointee Anthony Kennedy
announced his retirement from the Supreme Court. In addition to being the Supreme
Court’s last remaining centrist or swing vote, Kennedy was the last remaining
Republican-appointed justice on the Supreme Court with no ties to the Federalist
Society. Kennedy was replaced with Brett Kavanaugh who, as was well-documented
during his extremely controversial confirmation hearings, has long-standing and deep
ties to the Federalist Society network. See generally Josh Gerstein, Gorsuch takes
victory
lap
at
Federalist
dinner,
POLITICO (Nov.
16,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/16/neil-gorsuch-federalist-society-speechscotus-246538 [https://perma.cc/3L37-T6QF]. Toobin, supra note 106.
111. Michael Kruse, The Weekend at Yale Politics that Changed American
Politics,
POLITICO
MAGIZINE
(Oct.
2018),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/27/federalist-society-yale-historyconservative-law-court-219608 [https://perma.cc/5JVR-FFYM]; Annie Grayer, Brett
Kavanaugh was concerned with his Federalist Society membership in 2001, emails
show, CNN, (Aug. 19, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/19/politics/brettkavanaugh-federalist-society-emails/index.html [https://perma.cc/F5DD-D2EJ].
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the Supreme Court.112 As I tell my students every year when I do my judicial
process lecture, the late Justice William Brennan was reported to have told
every incoming class of law clerks that the “Rule of Five” is the most
important rule to learn in Supreme Court jurisprudence.113 Why? Because
“with five votes, you could accomplish anything.”114 Just imagine what the
Federalist Society will be able to do with six.
If we trust the political science on this matter – and I do – then the
Federalist Society’s increasingly open ties to the Republican Party, and
specifically the Trump administration, is problematic from the standpoint of
judicial independence and legitimacy and is contributing to what Balkin calls
“constitutional rot.” Recall that political scientists have shown empirically
that when the public views the courts as “just another political institution,”
their trust and belief in the legitimacy of the courts suffers.115 Whether the
courts have, in fact, been captured by the Federalist Society is not what I am
here to debate. Just as the standard in campaign finance law is not just
“corruption” but also “the appearance of corruption,” our conversation needs
to focus not just on “capture” but also on “the appearance of capture.”
The Federal Judicial Conference recognized this, too. Advisory Opinion
117 sought to amend the Judicial Code of Conduct to bar sitting federal judges
from participating in conferences and seminars sponsored by groups
“generally viewed by the public as having adopted a consistent political or
ideological point of view equivalent to the type of partisanship often found in
political organizations.”116 Though this advisory opinion was eventually
withdrawn after intense opposition from Republican Senators and over 200
Republican-appointed judges, its objectives were consistent with what the
political science literature tells us. When judges participate in organizations
that are “generally viewed by the public as having adopted a consistent
political or ideological point of view,” judicial legitimacy suffers; distrust in
the courts increases, and, as Balkin reminds us, constitutional rot deepens.117

C. Ingredients of Constitutional Rot: A More Supreme Court118

112. Noah Feldman, Democrats Can’t Stop Brett Kavanaugh’s Confirmation,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-0904/kavanaugh-hearings-federalist-society-is-so-close-to-victory.
113. SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION
196 (2010).
114. Id.
115. Gibson & Nelson, supra note 69, at 592.
116. Amanda Hollis-Brusky & Calvin TerBeek, The Federalist Society Says It’s
Not an Advocacy Organization. These Documents Show Otherwise, POLITICO, Aug.
13, 2019.
117. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 151 (“Rot both produces and is caused by
distrust in government institutions, especially the courts.”).
118. Parts of this section originally appear in Hollis-Brusky, supra note 12.
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Perhaps equally as pernicious for our constitutional design and the rule
of law, political polarization in Congress effectively weakens the checks and
balances built into the constitution by empowering judges to have the final
say in the interpretation and implementation of policy. In short, it makes the
Supreme Court even more supreme.
When political scientists discuss the checks and balances between the
courts and Congress, they often point out that the courts do not necessarily
have the final say in matters of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 119
“The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court relations,” Richard
Hasen writes, “is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation:
Congress writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress has
the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations.”120
If, for instance, the courts interpret a federal statute in a way Congress
does not like or agree with, the latter can pass an override that revises or fixes
the statute, which is what happened when the Supreme Court narrowly
interpreted the statute of limitations for filing an equal pay lawsuit regarding
pay discrimination under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.121 Congress responded
by passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, which clarified that the
statute of limitations resets with every paycheck affected by discriminatory
action.122 If the courts strike down part of a statute as unconstitutional,
Congress can propose a constitutional amendment to address it, as it did with
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which overrode the Supreme Court’s decision
regarding lowering the voting age in Oregon v. Mitchell (1970).123
Alternatively, Congress can rewrite the statute or part of the statute so that it
aligns with the court’s understanding of the Constitution.
But when political polarization results in gridlock and paralysis in
Congress, its ability to “counteract” the “ambition” of the courts is severely
compromised (to return to Madison’s Federalist No. 51).124 Two different
scholars, using different methodologies, studied congressional overrides of
Supreme Court decisions and reached the same conclusion: the number of
congressional overrides of court decisions has dramatically declined since

119. Lawrence Baum & Lori Hausegger, The Supreme Court and Congress:
Reconsidering the Relationship, in MAKING POLICY, MAKING LAW: AN INTERBRANCH
PERSPECTIVE 107 (Mark C. Miller & Jeb Barnes eds., 2004).
120. Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue?, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 208
(2013).
121. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
122. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
123. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
124. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 290 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1999).
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1998.125 This means that, for all intents and purposes, the Court has the final
say in matters of statutory and constitutional interpretation, which has real,
practical consequences for the checks and balances between the branches. As
Hasen concludes, “In a highly polarized atmosphere and with Senate rules
usually requiring sixty votes to change the status quo, the Court’s word on the
meaning of statutes is now final almost as often as its word on constitutional
interpretation.”126
When, for example, the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, struck
down Section 4 (the coverage formula) of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby
County v. Holder (2013),127 Chief Justice John Roberts suggested in his
opinion that Congress could simply update the coverage formula and make
the statute constitutional: “Congress may draft another formula based on
current conditions . . . Our country has changed, and while any racial
discrimination in voting is too much, Congress must ensure that the legislation
it passes to remedy that problem speaks to current conditions.”128 But, as all
astute political observers at the time recognized, this invitation to Congress to
simply “draft another formula” would not be taken up.
In the dialogue that has traditionally characterized Court-Congress
relations, Congress has effectively silenced itself through polarization and
gridlock and has, as a consequence, shifted the balance of power to the courts.
Practically speaking, this means that the Court has the final say in matters of
statutory and constitutional interpretation, which has consequences for the
checks and balances between the branches. This can mean that five men – or
five men and one woman – get the final say on the most significant political
questions facing our country.

III. CONCLUSION: ROT, CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL & CALLS FOR
COURT REFORM
As this Article has illustrated, our polarized politics have led to
ideologically-motivated and partisan appointments to the federal courts,
invited minority capture of the policymaking process by a small group of
unelected lawyers and judges, and aggravated some of the more pernicious
features of our constitutional design and encouraged – even rewarded – more
partisan decisionmaking by the judges and Justices on the federal bench.
Political science warns us that the politicization of the federal courts has grave
consequences for judicial independence. The mere perception that courts are
partisan and captured – whether or not we are convinced that this is an
empirical reality – can cause “we the people” to call into question the very
legitimacy of the federal courts and their rulings. When we couple these
125. See Hasen, supra note 120; Matthew R. Christiansen, Congressional
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2014).
126. Hasen, supra note 120, at 209.
127. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
128. Id. at 557.
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problematic perceptions of the judiciary with the very real fact that the word
of the courts is increasingly final and increasingly supreme on account of
polarization and gridlock in Congress, then it is no overstatement to say we
are at an inflection point in our constitutional democracy.
It is worthwhile to recall Thomas Jefferson’s warnings in 1819 about the
unique threat judicial supremacy poses for our entire constitutional system.129
In his letter to Spencer Roane, Jefferson warned that making the judiciary –
an unelected, unaccountable branch of government – too powerful would
constitute, in his words, a “felo de se” (suicide) of our constitutional system:
[F]or intending to establish three departments, coordinate and
independent, that they might check and balance one another, it has
given according to this opinion, to one of them alone the right to
prescribe rules for the government of the others; and to that one too
which is unelected by, and independent of, the nation.130

Jefferson is reminding us of the dark side of judicial independence – the
possibility of an unaccountable and unchecked rule by a few over the many.
And, as Brutus warns, “Men,” and I will add women, “placed in this situation
will generally soon feel themselves independent of heaven itself.”131
This is why, as Jack Balkin astutely predicts in The Cycles of
Constitutional Time,132 scholars, students, and now even elites and legislators
in the Democratic Party are talking seriously about court reform and, in doing
so, exhuming Brutus to illustrate the dark, dangerous, and even destructive
side of judicial independence. The fevered push by Senate Republicans and
President Trump to fill Ginsburg’s seat over the late Justice’s own dying wish
and the desire of millions of Americans to wait until after the presidential
election is exactly the kind of episode of “constitutional hardball” that has and
continues to characterize our period of constitutional rot.133 As Balkin notes,
“Rot leads to ever more aggressive rounds of constitutional hardball; it causes

129. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819) (available
on
Founders
Online,
NATIONAL
ARCHIVES,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-0734).
130. Id.
131. Letters of Brutus, XV, N.Y. J., March, 20, 1788, reprinted in THE COMPLETE
ANTI-FEDERALIST 186 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
132. Balkin, supra note 8, at 148–51.
133. Nina Totenberg, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Champion of Gender
Equality,
Dies
at
87,
NPR
(Sept.
18,
2020,
7:28
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/18/100306972/justice-ruth-bader-ginsburg-championof-gender-equality-dies-at-87.
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politicians to believe that they should risk reprisals to force a victory now
before the other side has a chance to force a victory on them.”134
This brazen and seemingly hypocritical political move by the
Republicans in power – a move that has solidified a super-majority
conservative voting bloc on the Supreme Court for the GOP into the
foreseeable future – was, as it turns out, an inflection point for the left. This
dramatic episode has catapulted the issue of court reform onto the political
agenda for Democrats. While the hashtag #PackTheCourt was trending on
Twitter during the nomination hearings of Amy Coney Barrett (and continues
to be a rallying call for the left on social media sites), President Joe Biden has
committed only to a bipartisan courts commission,135 to study the various
options that would be available to his administration under unified
government.
Like President Biden, Jack Balkin urges the Democrats to proceed with
caution and resist the allure of “packing the court” – that is, expanding the
number of seats on the Supreme Court and lower courts so that Democrats can
fill them with ideologically compatible judges and Justices.136 As Balkin
warns, “Packing the Supreme Court by increasing its membership does
nothing to promote public trust in the courts or the political branches. It
encourages constitutional hardball by the other side. It is likely to increase
polarization.”137 In short, Balkin, concludes, court packing “may make liberal
Democrats feel better, but it will not address the deeper causes of rot in our
constitutional system.”138
Instead, Balkin recommends four kinds of reforms that would tend to
“lower the stakes” of judicial appointments, thereby deescalating the arms
race the parties have been engaged in over the Supreme Court for the last
decade and a half in particular: (1) Instituting regular and predictable Supreme
Court appointments; (2) creating a practical equivalent of term limits for
Supreme Court Justices; (3) giving the Supreme Court less control over its
own docket; and (4) using sunrise provisions that will encourage bipartisan
reform.139
The Balkin-Biden approach – which seeks to deescalate, disarm, take
down the heat – seems to follow from the analysis and drivers of the cycles of
polarization and depolarization in The Cycles of Constitutional Time.140 But
it also seems illustrative of the Democrats’ tendency toward unilateral
disarmament, especially when it concerns the courts. The more impatient or
134. Balkin, supra note 8, at 151.
135. See, e.g., Jennifer Rubin, Opinion, Biden’s Court Commission Strikes the
Right
Balance,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
23,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/23/bidens-court-commissionstrikes-right-balance/.
136. Balkin, supra note 8, at 151.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 152.
140. Id. at 30–37.
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militant wings of the left, those advocating for immediate and dramatic
escalation proportional to the Garland and Ginsburg episodes, are likely to see
this as another concession from Democrats to a long-gone aspiration of
civility that the Republicans have decisively abandoned in the name of
constitutional hardball. If, as Balkin and political scientists contend, we are
seeing the results of asymmetric polarization141 – that is, the Republicans have
moved farther to the right than the Democrats have to the left – then we might
understand this set of court reform recommendations as an illustration of
asymmetric constitutional hardball.
Faced with a conservative constitutional regime that was given a lastminute artificial life-extension just days before an election that handed the
presidency to the Democrats by over five million votes, those on the left are
likely to become impatient waiting for the judiciary – by natural process of
replacement – to catch up to the American people. A more symmetrical
response from the Biden administration might be one that satisfies the calls
from the left for a more proportional response to the Republican Party’s
escalating constitutional warfare (#PackTheCourt) but that would still put us
on the path towards deescalation and the regularizing of Supreme Court
appointments. Introducing four or six new, term-limited seats on the Supreme
Court could achieve the long-term goals outlined by Balkin in The Cycles of
Constitutional Time while in the short term providing restitution or restorative
justice for those on the left who believe the Republicans effectively stole two
seats from them.142 Given that the political opportunity structure may not
allow for any serious court reform bills to be passed until after the next
midterm elections, the Democrats have some time on their hands.143
141. Id. at 162. See generally MATT GROSSMAN & DAVID A. HOPKINS,
ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST
DEMOCRATS (2016).
142. The details of such a proposal could be fleshed out by the Courts
Commission. But, in brief, these four or six new seats would need to be staggered in
their terms – two at 18 year terms, two at 12 year terms, two at 8 year terms for
example – so they would not all replaced at once by a single future president. When
the non-term limited Justices retired, their seat would then become term-limited and
be eligible for a single agreed-upon term (18 or 12 years seem to be the most popular
proposals). As the new justices rotated off at varying points, their seats would also
revert to the single agreed-upon term. Eventually, we would have 13 or 15 termlimited seats and achieve regularized judicial appointments, which Balkin
recommends as a longer term solution to polarization and escalating partisan warfare
over judicial appointments.
143. At the time of this writing it appears as if even if the Democrats win both
of the run-off races for Senate in Georgia, they would at best have a 50-50 split in the
Senate. Even with vice-president elect Kamala Harris as the tie-breaker, conservative
Democrat Joe Manchin of West Virginia has signaled that he has no interest in
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In the meantime, a six-Justice super-majority on the Supreme Court will,
depending on how far they want to push their conservative counterrevolution,
determine how urgent and how central the issue of court reform remains for
the Democrats leading into the 2022 midterm elections.144 These six
Republican-appointed Justices will determine through the scope and direction
of their rulings whether Brutus and his dire warnings of the dangers of judicial
independence are exhumed once again and weaponized in service of radical
court restructuring and change, or whether Brutus is left interred, lying
dormant until the next cycle of constitutional rot.

eliminating the filibuster; a move that would be required for any court reform
proposals to make it through that branch and land on President Biden’s desk.
144.
About
the
Court,
SUP.
CT.
OF
THE
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2021), for
who appointed each of the current members of the Supreme Court.
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